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STATE SECURITIES REGISTRATION: AN UNRESOLVED
DILEMMA AND A SUGGESTION FOR THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE
by
Hal M. Bateman*
And, finally, although this is a very delicate area, some thought
should be given to the relations between these federal statutes and the
state blue sky laws. The political difficulties here are obvious. But
certainly we should not exclude this subject from consideration, because, if there is ever an opportunity to do something about it, this
will be it, and surely some rationalization should be possible after
thirty-five years or more of joint federal-state regulation.
I would not suggest complete preemption as either desirable or remotely feasible politically, but there are things that might be considered.
We might at the very least think about preempting the field and
making the states stay out unless they coordinate their procedure with
the federal procedure, as is done under the Uniform Securities Act.'
The problem referred to by Professor Loss is well known to securities
lawyers throughout the United States. It has produced chronic and increasing frustration and expenses for issuers involved in public securities
distributions and their attorneys for more than four decades. Yet vigorous
to
debate, which has continued since the end of World War II, has failed
2
produce any consensus as to how, if at all, the matter should be resolved.
The problem arises essentially from the fact that, due to express nonpreemption on the federal level,8 a public distribution of securities is subject
to administrative regulation concurrently and independently on the federal
level and on the state level in each state where the issue is offered. The
obvious difficulties produced by this multiplicity of jurisdictions which may
regulate a single distribution of corporate securities are further compounded
by the fact that the "merit standard" regulatory philosophy reflected in
most of the applicable state laws 4 lends itself to widely varied interpretation
* B.A., Rice University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Professor of Law,
Texas Tech University.
I From remarks by Professor Louis Loss, the reporter for the ALl, Federal Securities Code, at the American Law Institute's meeting in Washington on May 22, 1969,
and reprinted in Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25
Bus. LAw. 27, 35-36 (1969).
2The basic positions taken in this debate are discussed in 1 L. Loss, SEcunrnss
REGuLATION 102-05 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. More detailed analysis
and references will be found in part II infra.
8 Securities Act of 1933, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1970).

4 The term "merit standard philosophy" is used to identify the general type of securities registration laws in effect in most states today, under which the administrative
authority is vested with discretionary power to pass on the investment merits of an
issue of securities proposed to be offered to the public, and to deny the right to sell
the issue to the public if it is found to be without sufficient merit for public investment.
The historical sources and rationale of this philosophy will be discussed later in the
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from state to state and from one securities issue to another, and stands in
sharp contrast to the "disclosure philosophy" reflected on the federal level
in the Securities Act of 1933.5 Thus, there are two distinct aspects to
the basic problem: (1) a single corporate financing may be subject concurrently to a multiplicity of regulatory jurisdictions, and (2) those jurisdictions apply standards which reflect a fundamental difference in regulatory philosophies.
The suggestion by Professor Loss that the proposed Federal Securities
Code0 should come to grips with this regulatory dilemma and should attempt
to arrive at "some rationalization" of it is indeed timely and meritorious.
It is to be hoped that such a goal can be achieved. Nevertheless, the
sharply divergent viewpoints expressed over the past two and one-half
decades concerning the basic aspects of the problem must be resolved in
order to achieve a satisfactory and feasible solution. This Article win attempt to analyze the nature and historical sources of the -problem, review
the various arguments advanced in the debate over its solution, and propose
a new approach to a resolution of the dilemma which might be considered
for inclusion in the proposed Federal Securities Code.
I.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE AND HISTORICAL
SOURCES OF THE PROBLEM

A. Economic Aspects
An analysis of the regulatory dilemma which confronts a corporate issuer
planning to make a public distribution of its securities should begin with a
consideration of the economic function and significance of the distribution
itself. First, from the standpoint of the corporate issuer the basic function
and purpose of the public distribution of its securities is to raise new capital
to finance its business activity. This is true whether the public financing
is' needed to make possible the launching of a new business venture based
on a new discovery, invention, or other business opportunity, or whether it
is needed to finance the further growth and expansion of an established,
successful business enterprise, be it large or small. In this context the public
securities distribution represents a vitally important alternative source of
capital to finance business and industrial growth, without which the dramatic
industrial growth of the United States over the past century might never have
been possible. In the language of Circuit Judge Medina in United States
v. Morgan:
text.

See J. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 15-17

(1971) [hereinafter cited as MoFsKY].
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970). The term "disclosure philosophy" refers to the
method of regulation of public securities offerings which requires full and effective disclosure to public investors and to the administrative authority of all information pertaining to the security offered which would be necessary to enable investors to make
informed investment decisions. This philosophy does not authorize the administrative
authority to deny the right to sell the security on the basis of its own determination of
investment merits. The historical sources and rationale of this philosophy will be discussed later in the text. See 1 Loss 121-28.
6 Ile history and purposes of the Federal Securities Code project, which is currently
in progress, is described in Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code
Project, 25 Bus. LAw. 27 (1969).
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It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of investment
banking to the national economy. The vast industrial growth of the
past fifty years has covered the United States with a network of manufacturing, processing, sales and distributing plants, the smooth functioning of which is vital to our welfare as a nation. They vary from
huge corporate structures such as the great steel and automobile companies, railroads and airlines, producers of commodities and merchandise of all kinds, oil companies and public utilities, down to comparatively small manufacturing plants and stores. The variety and usefulness of these myriad enterprises defy description. They are the
result of American ingenuity and the will to work unceasingly and
to improve our standard of living. But adequate financing for their
needs is the life blood without which many if not most of these parts of
of business would cease to function in a healthy,
the great machine
7
normal fashion.
This is to say that the public distribution of securities, rather than being
inherently suspect, actually serves a legitimate and necessary economic
and social purpose.
Second, from the standpoint of public investors, the public distribution of
securities provides an important medium for individual investment in business enterprise. Individual investors may, of course, participate either in
the primary distribution itself or in the trading markets which arise from
and are presumed in the primary distribution. But in either case public
distributions of corporate securities are essential to the creation of varied
investment opportunities for individual investors throughout the United
States. Through investment in publicly distributed and traded securities,
individual investors may participate in the fortunes of a wide variety of
business enterprises and, hopefully, may accumulate greater individual
wealth. Obviously, the greater the number and variety of securities issues
which are publicly distributed, the greater the number and variety of investment opportunities there will be for public investors to select among in
developing their individual investment portfolios.
Thus, public securities distributions play a key role in capital formation,
and in the development of economic resources and potential for both
business and industrial issuers of the securities and for the members of the
public who invest in them. Without this diversified financial medium the
capital resources of business would be constricted and individual investors
would be quite limited in the investment possibilities available to them.
Neither consequence would serve the public interest.
Both aspects of public securities distributions have experienced dramatic growth in the United States over the past century. This has brought
about important changes in the role of public securities distributions in
corporate financial planning and in the number, experience, and characteristics of public investors in corporate securities. There has been a concurrent evolution in the size, nature, and sophistication of the public securities
markets for distribution of new issues and those for trading in outstanding
securities. There is, thus, considerable contrast between the corporate is7 118 F. Supp. 621, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).

To the same effect, see MOFSKY 5-8.
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suers, the ,public investors, and the securities markets of today and those of
an earlier generation.
Before the turn of the century most businesses, other than railroads and
utilities, were capitalized through the private resources of the immediate owners, their relatives, and associates, and through the conventional channels of
commercial credit.8 Similarly, most individuals had virtually no involvement
in the public securities markets and rarely invested in corporate securities.
The savings of most persons were usually invested in land, saving institutions,
life insurance reserves, annuities, and similar resources more familiar to them.
Accordingly, the public securities markets were very limited in scope and involved relatively few corporate issuers, investors, and investment banking
firms, most of whom were geographically concentrated in the northeastern
United States.9
The era of economic expansion between 1900 and World War I actually
brought about the initial development of markets for the distribution of a
variety of corporate securities to the public on any significant scale. New
distribution techniques were developed which laid the foundation for many
later developments, and the concept of individual investment in corporate
securities became more widely accepted. The principal impetus behind
this development was the expanding need of many growing businesses for
new sources of capital. 10 It was inevitable, however, that the same healthy
economic development also opened the door for a number of fraudulent promotions, and enabled unscrupulous securities salesmen to take advantage
of a relatively inexperienced and unsophisticated group of public investors."
It was not, however, until World War I that the public securities distribus United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 636-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Railroads
and utilities, of course, had large capital needs which were met principally through the
distribution of bond issues. Many of these bonds were distributed to the public in the
post-Civil War era through direct selling campaigns following promotional techniques
developed by Jay Cooke during the Civil War. MOFSKY 5-9. Indeed, Professor Mofsky
traces the earliest development of widespread public securities distributions to this era.
Nevertheless, prior to the turn of the century the number and variety of businesses
and industries involved was very small, and only a very limited portion of the population was engaged in investment in corporate securities to any significant extent.
0 United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 636-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). In the
course of tracing the evolution of the investment banking industry in the United States
and the methods of distributing new issues of securities to the public, Judge Medina
states:
Prior to the year 1900, the large majority of industrial and business
units which existed in this country were small in size and their capital
needs were small; use of the corporate form was not widespread. There
was no substantial and widely scattered class of persons with surplus
savings who sought promising investment opportunities. A large part of
the capital needed came from abroad. Securities sales operations were
conducted principally by selling agents who sold on a commission basis,
and more often than not it was the issuer who bore the risk of how
successfully and how quickly the required funds would be obtained.
Id. at 636.
10 Judge Medina describes the developments in this era in United States v. Morgan,
118 F. Supp. 621, 637-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
11 A classic illustration of such promotions is described in Old Dominion Copper
Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1908), and Old Dominion Copper
Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909). Comparable
activities on behalf of reputable, established business under the direction of "the Money
Trust" are described in L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (new ed. 1932). See also
MOFSKY 9-10.
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tion and trading markets began to develop to anything like their modem
national proportions and that large numbers of the population first became
actively involved in securities investments on a nationwide basis. The event
which produced these developments was the Liberty Loan of 1917 to finance the war effort, which required massive selling efforts from coast to
coast. Its success produced for the first time both a large new class of
public investors in securities and a securities distribution and marketing
12
mechanism of truly national dimensions.
In the decade following World War I both securities distributions and the
securities investing public grew rapidly and extensively, as the nation experienced an industrial and business expansion of unprecedented proportions. The economic and business growth of this period required large
amounts of new capital and produced a heavy volume of new public securities distributions, which, in turn, led to steady growth in the national securities marketing mechanism and in the number and geographic dispersion of the American securities investing public.1 3
The securities market crash of 1929 and the economic depression that
followed inevitably interrupted the flow of new securities distributions and
the growth of the securities markets, but within a few years the capital needs
of businesses forced a resumption of securities distributions,'1 4 and the num5
ber of public investors in corporate securities resumed its steady increase.'
The steady growth in public securities distributions to finance business
and industrial expansion and in the number and dispersion of public investors in corporate securities ,has continued unabated from the end of World
War II to the present time. 16 By the end of 1970 the American shareholder population had grown dramatically to 30,850,000 individuals, according to a share ownership study by the New York Stock Exchange, and
in early 1972 the number of individual shareholders was estimated by the
Exchange at 32,500,000.17 According to the same study, "Financial assets
of individuals in the United States reached $2,243 billion at the end of 1971,
compared with $1,787 billion at the end of 1967. Of this total, $879 billion, or over 39%, was in common and preferred stock."' 8 This was by far
12 1

1953).
13

Loss 114-15; United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 638-41 (S.D.N.Y.

Judge Medina describes these events in United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp.

621, 641-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
14 See Judge Medina's description, id. at 646-47.

15 "By the end of 1939 it was estimated that between 8 and 9 million people in the
United States owned corporate stock. . . . The steady increase in stock ownership has
been largely a concomitant, of course, of the continuous increase in the national wealth
and income."

1 Loss 115 n.8.

16 The statistical compilation in SEC, DISCLOSURE

TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS, app. 11-1 (CCH ed.
1969) [hereinafter cited and referred to as the WHEAT REPORT] presents useful basic
data reflecting these developments from 1920 through 1967.
17 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., 1972 FACT BOOK 47 (1972).
These estimates
include shareholders of investment companies but exclude beneficiaries of pension and
profit-sharing plans and similar institutional holdings. The latest survey indicates a
slight but insignificant decline in the number of individual shareholders by the end
of 1972. The breadth of the geographic dispersion of the individual shareholders of
publicly held corporations is demonstrated in the table, id. at 48.
IsId.at 68.
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the largest single investment medium chosen by individual investors. 19 Similarly, corporate financing through the public distribution of securities had
progressed to record levels in 1971, with an extraordinary rise in new is20
sues of common and preferred stocks.
Inevitably, these developments since World War I have been accompanied by a radical increase in the experience and sophistication of individual investors throughout the United States with respect to investments in
corporate securities. 21 Today millions of highly literate, well educated,
individual investors consume countless investment periodicals and are
furnished with a wide variety of investment services by an increasingly professionalized brokerage community. Business and financial news constitutes a regular part of the nation's daily newspapers and is regularly
covered by the broadcast media. The flow of relevant investment information compelled by the federal securities laws since 1933 has had a significant impact. It is therefore obvious that the individual investor of today is
significantly better informed and more knowledgeable with respect to investment in securities than his ancestor of the pre-World War I era.
In summary, it is clear that today, more than ever before, public securities distributions are of major importance in American economic life and
play a vital role in the financial planning and growth of corporate issuers
and of individual investors alike. From the same analysis it is also clear
that present day securities distributions and securities markets generally are,
with few exceptions, inescapably national and interstate in character. The
individual investors of today, with their greater experience, flow of information, and access to the national securities markets, are rarely involved with
exclusively local securities investments. It is, therefore, appropriate to approach the legal issues involved in the regulatory dilemma which confronts
corporate issuers of securities with these factors in mind.
B.

The Historical Sources of the Regulatory Pattern
The history and dimensions of state securities regulation have been
thoroughly traced and analyzed elsewhere. 22 No attempt need be made
here to restate that story in full. It is pertinent to the present discussion,
however, to consider a few of the principal milestones of particular relevance
to the current regulatory dilemma in their historical contexts.
Today the District of Columbia and all of the states have some type of
state securities regulation or "blue sky laws."' 23 These involve varied combinations of antifraud provisions, broker-dealer regulation and securities
19 Id. The next largest medium for investment chosen by individuals, according
to this study, was time deposits and savings shares, which accounted for only $493 billion
of the total financial assets of individuals.
20

Id. at 66-67.

21 Cf. WHEAT REPORT 46-54.

22 1 Loss 23-107; L. Loss & E. CowETT, BLUE SKY LAw 3-42 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as Loss & CowETr]; MOFSKY 5-17.
23 W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1477 (4th ed. unabridged
1969) [hereinafter cited as CARY]; MOFSKY 3 n.l. Delaware adopted a blue sky law,
effective July 13, 1973. DEiL. CODE ANN. fit. 6, § 7301-29 (1973). The term "blue sky

law" originated with the Kansas statute of 1911. Loss & CowETr 7.
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registration requirements. 24 However, securities registration requirements in
one form or another are found in virtually all of the state securities laws,
and in the great majority of them these requirements are predicated on the
merit standard philosophy. 25 Generally, the securities registration provisions have also become the most prominent aspect of the blue sky laws,
both with respect to the relative degree of emphasis placed on them by
most state administrators and with respect to their relative importance to
attorneys concerned with the blue sky laws, 26 and only these provisions are
the subject of the present discussion.
The prevailing merit standard approach to state securities registration is
generally conceded to have been introduced by the Kansas statute enacted
in 1911,27 based on the sweeping victory of the Populist Party in Kansas in
1910.28 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Kansas statute was heavily influenced by Populist economic philosophy and took a strictly regulatory, paternalistic approach to securities registration to protect the public in
the "Agrarian West" against being bled by the "Moneyed East."' 29 Under
this statute, except for a few specifically exempted securities, no security
could be sold in Kansas until a "permit" had been obtained from the state
commissioner, who was authorized to deny the "permit" if he should find
that the organizational documents of the issuer or the issuer's plan of business or proposed contracts "contain any provision that is unfair, unjust, inequitable or oppressive to any class of contributors, or if he decides from
his examination of its affairs that said [issuer] is not solvent and does not
intend to do a fair and honest business, and in his judgment does not
promise a fair return on the stocks, bonds, or other securities by it offered
for sale .

.

"30

The shocking strictness and breadth of administrative discretion in this
regulation of the flow of capital and of investment opportunities available
to the public is better understood in the light of the conditions prevailing at
the time of its adoption. First, there was no federal securities regulation in
effect at the time. 1 Second, Populist economic philosophy generally favored strong governmental control and regulation of economic and financial
resources to direct them toward the public interest.32 Third, as outlined in
24 CARY 1477-81; 1 Loss 30-63; Loss & CowErT 17-42; MOFSKY 3 n.1.
25 CARY 1479-80; 1 Loss 49-63; 4 id. 2222-38 (Supp. 1969); MOFSKY 15-17.

The

merit standard philosophy is briefly described in note 4 supra.

26 See MOFSKY 15-17. The securities registration provisions of the blue sky laws
have undoubtedly been the principal source of controversy and debate.
27

28
29

Ch. 133, [1911] Kan. Laws 210.

1 Loss 27; Loss & CowErr 7; MOFSKY 10.
1 Loss 27; Loss & CowmT 7-10.

See also MOFSKY 10-11.

30Ch. 133, § 5, [1911] Kan. Laws 212; 1 Loss 27.

31 Federal securities regulation began with the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-aa (1970).
32 The Populist Party arose out of the economic distress of farmers in the West and
South at a time when Eastern financial interests were prospering following the 1873
panic. Consequently, much of its focus was on economic and financial issues. For
example, the platform adopted at the 1892 convention in Omaha, Nebraska, favored
governmental ownership and operation of the railroads and the telephone and telegraph
systems, recovery by the government of land given to the railroads, a revision of the

banking system and a graduated income tax, in addition to free coinage of silver and
an ample supply of paper money.

See generally J. HIcKs, THE POPULIST REVOLT
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the foregoing discussion, American capital markets and public securities distributors were in their relative infancy, particularly outside the northeastern
United States. The public generally was neither well informed nor experienced in the matter of securities investments to any significant degree.
Most of the population was agrarian, modestly educated, and easy prey to
unscrupulous promoters and securities salesmen, who were essentially unregulated and unrestrained by any effective professional standards. Thus,
conditions were ripe for legislative reform to protect the public from overreaching by promoters and securities salesmen, and the financial turbulence
precipitated by the panic of 1907 provided the catalyst, while Populist
economic philosophy directed the substantive nature of that reform.8 3 In
the words of one sympathetic commentator at the time:
The state of Kansas, most wonderfully prolific and rich in farming
products, has a large proportion of agriculturists not versed in ordinary business methods. The State was the happy hunting ground of
promoters of fraudulent enterprises; in fact their frauds became so barefaced that it was stated that they would sell building lots in the blue
sky in fee simple. Metonymically they became known as the blue sky
merchants and the 34legislation intended to prevent their frauds was
called Blue Sky Law.
This is to say, then, that both the fact and the substantive nature of the
securities registration law adopted by Kansas in 1911 were to a large extent historically conditioned by the circumstances prevailing in Kansas at
that time.
It is not surprising that within two years twenty-three other states, most of
which, like Kansas, were predominantly agrarian and had Populist leanings,
adopted statutes which in most cases were based directly on the Kansas Blue
Sky Law.8 5 But Washington and Oregon in the Pacific Northwest and
most Eastern states refused to follow at that time.a6
Constitutional uncertainties were ultimately resolved by the Supreme
Court in favor of these laws in 1917. The Court held, in a group of cases
relating to the laws of three states, that in the absence of congressional
legislation on the subject, the statutes did not impose an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce, were a valid exercise of the police power
of the states, and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 7 Again,
however, consideration of historical context of these cases is relevant. 1917
(1931, rev. 1961); R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955); F. MCVEY, TiE
POPULIST MOVEMENT (1931).
33 1 Loss 7; MOFSKY 9-10; cf. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550-51
(1917). On the 1907 panic and subsequent financial turbulence, see D. DEWEY, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 481-94 (12th ed. 1968); M. MYERS, A FrNANcIAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

245-69 (1970).

Loss & COWETr 7 n.22, quoting Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L.T. 37 (1916).
35 Loss & COWETr 10. These were Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North
34

Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Vermont,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at 10 n.28.
3
6 MOFSKY 11-12.
37 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock
Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
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was the year of the Liberty Loan to finance World War I which marked
the beginning of the first truly national public securities markets. Thus, the
cases deciding the constitutionality of the blue sky laws, like the statutes
themselves, arose in the previous era when national securities markets were
relatively undeveloped and nationwide securities distributions were infrequent.
During the next decade the spread of state securities registration statutes
continued, usually following the merit standard or licensing approach introduced by Kansas with varying degrees of strictness. 38 Also, earlier statutes underwent revision, both to improve their draftsmanship and particularly
to enlarge on the scope of the exemptions. Indeed, it was soon recognized
by those who opposed the blue sky laws on the grounds that they were unreasonably severe that political realities in state legislatures made it far
easier to expand the area of exemptions than to effect repeal of the laws
or to alter the basic philosophy of regulation.A9 Thus, this pattern, which
has continued ever since, 40 meant that, despite the apparent strictness of
the blue sky laws and their wider adoption, their actual impact was narrowing in scope and a growing volume of securities transactions was unaffected by them. This phenomenon helps to explain why, despite the
proliferation of blue sky laws, American securities markets underwent dramatic expansion during the decade following World War I and culminated in
the devastating market crash of 1929, against which the blue sky laws had
provided American investors virtually no protection whatever.
Federal securities registration requirements began with the Securities
Act of 1933. 41 By that time three facts existed which materially affected
the approach adopted in the federal act in two basic respects. First, securities
registration at the state level was widespread and well established. Second, beginning with the market collapse in 1929 public securities markets had experienced a severe loss of public confidence in investment in corporate
securities. Third, public securities markets and public investment in corporate
investment had grown substantially, both numerically and geographically, by
that time, and public sophistication with respect to investment in corporate
securities was significantly greater than it had been when the blue sky laws
were first adopted.
With these facts in evidence two decisions of basic importance were made
in the Securities Act of 1933. First, the securities registration requirements
of the Act were formulated entirely on the basis of the disclosure philosophy of the British statutes, which had experienced decades of success in
Britain. 4 2 An issuer offering securities for sale to the public was required to
make full disclosure to each prospective investor of all information necessary
for him to make an informed investment decision; and this requirement
was coupled with efficient statutory civil remedies for any deficiency in
the disclosure. But no administrative authority was given jurisdiction
38 1 Loss 28; MOFSKY 12.
39 1 Loss 64-67; MOFSKY 12.
40 See MOFSKY 59-66.
41 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
42 1 Loss 121-28; Landis, The
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29 (1959).

Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28
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to control or condition access to the public financial markets on the
basis of a determination of the investment merits of the security. Second,
the decision was made to include in the statute an express non-preemption
provision to preserve all existing state regulation in addition to the new fed43
eral regulation.
The decision to adopt the disclosure philosophy in the Securities Act of
1933, rather than the prevailing state merit standard philosophy, is significant. The first bills introduced in Congress to impose federal securities
registration requirements were patterned 'after existing state statutes and incorporated the state merit standard philosophy. 44 Ultimately, however, this
approach was specifically rejected and the bill based on the English disclosure philosophy was adopted instead. 4 5 This decision was based on the belief that a federal qualification statute based on merit standards would be
unworkable and unreasonable, and that, in any event, this was not the best
approach to securities registration. Congress considered it necessary to protect both the public investor and the financial needs of business enterprises.
With this purpose in view the disclosure philosophy was chosen as the best
protection for public investors, since it allowed each investor to make his
own investment decision based on full information, without imposing an unreasonable restraint on legitimate business finance. Finally, it was considered
essential to avoid the risk of implicit approval by the federal government of
the merits of any securities offered for sale to the public, since all securities
46
involve some degree of investment risk.
C.

The Regulatory Dilemma and Attempts To Resolve It

Due to the two basic decisions in the adoption of the Securities Act of
1933 described above, corporate issuers making public distributions of securities to raise needed capital have, since 1933, been confronted with the
regulatory dilemma outlined at the beginning of this Article. This involves
both a multiplicity of regulatory jurisdictions and a fundamental contrast of
regulatory philosophies.
The difficulties inherent in this situation began to receive attention in
the years following World War II and produced substantial debate over
the best solution. Ultimately a special study of blue sky law by Professor
Loss and Edward M. Cowett resulted in the drafting and promulgation of
the Uniform Securities Act in 1956, 47 the declared purposes and policies of
which were to achieve maximum uniformity among the states and coordination between state and federal securities registration requirements. 48 But in
45 Securities Act of 1933, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1970).
In view of the recent
collapse of the securities markets and loss of investor confidence, there was, as a prac-

tical matter, little prospect of displacing the entrenched blue sky laws with a new
federal act. Furthermore, such an attempt might well have increased constitutional
uncertainties concerning the Securities Act under the judicial attitudes which then prevailed.
44 Landis, supra note 42, at 30-33.
45 Id. at 32-49. See also 1 Loss 121-28.
46 Landis, supra note 42, at 32-49. See also
4

7 Loss & CowErr 233-34.

48

UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT

§ 415.

1 Loss 121-28.
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order to achieve maximum acceptance of the Act it was considered to be
a political necessity to adhere49 essentially to the prevailing merit standard
philosophy in a modified form.
In the years following 1956 the Uniform Act was widely acclaimed as a
major achievement and a substantial improvement in state securities regulation. It has been adopted in whole or in part by a great many states.
However, in many of these states significant changes have been made, often at the points at which uniformity was considered most necessary.50
As a result, comment on the success of the Uniform Act has varied. Some
have criticized it for not shifting to the disclosure philosophy of securities registration. 5 ' Others have criticized it as aiming at a mediocre leveling of
otherwise effective state securities legislation. 52 Still others have concluded
that the Uniform Act has actually achieved more in the area of providing
model statutory provisions in specific areas than in producing uniformity
among the states in those areas where uniformity was the most necessary.53
In any event, the Uniform Act, though a monumental piece of legislative
draftsmanship, has not actually resulted in a solution to the problems.
To some extent, difficulties in this area have been reduced by the efforts
of North American Securities Administrators and similar regional groups
in achieving a significant amount of cooperation among various administrators and some uniformity of approach to common problems.54 Of particular importance also is the development of uniform registration forms which
may be used in many states. 55 This materially reduces the volume of paper
work and some of the practical problems. 56 Nevertheless, the fact remains
that each of the administrators operating under a merit standard must make
his own individual decision concerning the merits of the proposed securities offering, and there is substantial risk that their decisions and the conditions they may impose may differ significantly. Thus, actual uniformity
appears to be elusive, the regulatory dilemma remains, and the debate as to
how it should be resolved has continued to the present.
II.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEBATE OVER THE
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM

A. The Patternsof Debate
The continuing debate over the best solution to the problems created by
the multiplicity and the disparity of securities registration requirements un49 Loss & CowETr 236-38.

50 Hill, Some Comments on the Uniform Securities Act, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 661
(1961); Loss, Developments in Blue Sky Laws, 14 Bus. LAw. 1161 (1959).
51 Bromberg, Book Review, 12 J. LEGAL ED. 127, 133-36 (1959).

52 Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 193, 222-30 (1958). But see Brainin & Davis, State
Regulation of the Sale of Securities: Some Comments, 14 Bus. LAW. 456 (1959), who

criticize the Act for tending to "level up" or increase the overall state regulation of
the sale of securities.
53 Hill, supra note 50.
54 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
507 (1967); 1 Loss 90-91.
55 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
4471-73 (1963); 4 Loss 2260-62 (Supp. 1969).

56 Cf. Brainin & Davis, supra note 52, who view this as the principal practicable
objective of blue sky law reform.
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der federal and state law has as yet failed to produce any generally accepted
solution. The positions taken in the course of this debate tend to fall into
three broad categories. First, some have argued vigorously for full federal
preemption of the field and the elimination of all state jurisdiction with respect to registration of securities offered for sale to the public, whether on
the basis of the merit standard philosophy, the disclosure philosophy, or
any other principle. 7 Second, this argument has been countered with an
equally vigorous defense of state jurisdiction and the right of each state to
require registration of securities offered for sale to the public on any basis
the state deems appropriate to protect its citizens.5 8 Usually, however, the
defenders of state jurisdiction are, at the same time, the principal advocates of the merit standard philosophy and critics of the disclosure phi.
losophy.59 Finally, the Uniform Securities Act has been urged by the third
group as the best solution and a reasonable compromise, since it retains both
state jurisdiction and the merit standard approach, but in a modified form,
and would promote uniformity among the states and coordination with
federal requirements. This, it is argued, should substantially reduce the
problems in this area.6 0
As might be expected, the principal criticism of each of the three main
positions tends to come from the advocates of the other two. Thus far the
result has been that state jurisdiction and the merit standard system have
been retained, which is consistent with two of the positions advanced. But
the state requirements have been modified both by the influence of the
Uniform Act and by a growing emphasis on the part of the states on disclosure to investors, usually in addition to merit standards. 6 1 The Uni57 Armstrong, The Blue Sky Laws, 44 VA. L. REv. 713 (1958); Millonzi, Concurrent Regulation of Interstate Securities Issues: The Need for CongressionalReappraisal,
49 VA. L. REV. 1483 (1963); Rostow, Book Review, 62 YALE L.J. 675, 677 (1953).
But cf. Bennett, Federal Regulation of Securities: An Appraisal of Policy, 7 J. PUB.
L. 410 (1958), who opposes federal preemption if it entails shifting the federal regulatory philosophy to any form of merit standard regulation. See also Gray, Blue Sky
Practice-A Morass?, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1519 (1969).
58 Hueni, Application of Merit Requirements in State Securities Regulation, 15
WAYNE L. REv. 1417 (1969); Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation
and Investor Protection, 23. LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 193 (1958).
59 See Hueni, supra note 58; Jennings, supra note 58; cf. MoFsKY; Bloomenthal,
Blue Sky Regulation and the Theory of Overkill, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1447 (1969);
Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on New Business Promotions, 1969 DUKE L.J. 273;
Mofsky, Reform of the Blue Sky Laws, 23 VAND. L. REV. 599 (1970); Mofsky, State
Securities Regulation and New Promotions: A Case History, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1401
(1969), all of which advance vigorous criticisms of state merit standard regulations and
argue for reform at the state level.
60 1 Loss 102-05; Loss & CowETr 236-44; Loss, The Uniform Securities Act and
the Bar, 13 Bus. LAW. 609 (1958). See also Edwards, California Measures the Uniform
Securities Act Against Its Corporate Securities Law, 15 Bus. LAW. 814 (1960); Hill,
supra note 50. Brainin & Davis, supra note 52, however, are generally critical of
both the Uniform Act and the federal preemption argument as failing to offer any
practical solution to the lawyer's problems in coping with the admittedly troublesome
system of state blue sky regulation.
61 Most states with traditional merit standard systems of securities registration have
added in recent years requirements of disclosure to investors, through use of a prospectus
or other means. In addition, a few states in very recent years have adopted securities
registration statutes based primarily on the disclosure philosophy. The latter group
includes Colorado, Maryland, Nebraska, New York, and Virginia, each of which has
embraced the disclosure philosophy in its own distinct way. See 1 Loss 54-58; 4 id.
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form Act has been adopted by a significant number of states, but frequently
with important changes at critical points. Many leading states, however,
have not adopted it.6 2 Hence, there has been some change in the overall
situation, but the issues have not been resolved, nor have the problems been
eliminated. It is, therefore, appropriate to examine closely each of the
three arguments which have been advanced in the debate and the criticism
of it by its opponents.
Federal Preemption. The argument for full federal preemption of state
jurisdiction 63 is based essentially on three interrelated premises. First, it is
argued that modern American securities markets have developed into a fully
unified national financial community which should only be regulated on the
national level and not subjected to multiple, diverse local regulation, since
this will materially and unreasonably interfere with nationwide financing of
legitimate business enterprise. In this respect it is pointed out that business
needs and the financial markets have developed dramatically since the blue
sky laws originated in 1911 and since the blue sky cases were decided in
1917. Therefore, it is observed, there has necessarily been a commensurate
growth in the numbers, experience, and sophistication of the investing public
during that time, and the development of an intricate and efficient nationwide securities marketing industry.
This conclusion leads into the second premise of the preemption argument. It is argued that the modern investing public and the needs of highly
developed free securities markets are today better served and better protected by regulation based on the disclosure philosophy, which gives investors a free choice of investment risks with an adequate, reliable supply of
information on the basis of which to make intelligent investment decisions.
It is contended that state blue sky laws based on the merit standard principle are anachronistic and constitute an unreasonable restraint on free investment decisions by members of the public and on free securities markets
under contemporary conditions.
Finally, the preemption argument emphasizes the high degree of skill,
sophistication, and flexibility which has traditionally characterized the administration of the federal securities laws by the SEC, in contrast to the often inept, understaffed, and occasionally biased, manner in which many
state securities agencies have functioned under blue sky statutes. It is also
argued that the equally superior federal disclosure philosophy reflects a national policy as to the best and most reasonable method of regulation in modem nationwide securities markets, and that the disclosure philosophy should,
therefore, be made exclusive by preemption of the parallel state regulation
based on the merit standard philosophy.
Critics of the preemption argument 64 have leveled three basic objections to
2227-30 (Supp. 1969); Loss, Developments in Blue Sky Laws, 15 Bus. LAw. 1021
(1960); Loss, supra note 50, at 1164-65.

62 Among the leading states, in terms of size and commercial activity, which have
substantial securities registration requirements and which have not adopted the Uniform
Act are California, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, and Texas.
63 See note 57 supra.

64 See note 58 supra.
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it, which thus far have prevented its gaining general acceptance. First, it is
argued that it is both politically not feasible and socially undesirable to preempt state laws designed to protect local residents from securities fraud and
overreaching. To persuade Congress to take such a step would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. In addition, it is argued that each state
should have the right to protect its citizens in the area of corporate abuses,
and that the states should be free to experiment with various methods to
achieve this end under the principles of federalism.
Second, it is observed that the SEC, despite its outstanding performance
in administering the federal laws, is wholly unequipped to take on the vast
additional burden implied in federal preemption. Even with its present
work load the SEC is frequently understaffed and unable to handle its work
load on a current basis. On occasions its work load has actually been increased due to changing conditions in the securities markets just at a time
when political and budget considerations were forcing limitations on appropriations for additional staff.
Finally, it is contended that the disclosure system provided by the Securities Act of 1933 is too mild a method of regulation to provide adequate
protection to the investing public. This criticism usually relies essentially on
two points, which reveal its limited scope. First, it is clear that specific problems have arisen under the system of disclosure provided by the Securities
Act of 1933. These include such matters as the unreadability of many
prospectuses and the fact that effective dissemination of prospectuses to investors has not been adequately guaranteed prior to the actual making of investment decisions. Second, the critics of -the disclosure philosophy focus
on a few spectacular historic instances of bad investment decisions by
many members of the public despite the full disclosure provided them under the Securities Act of 1933. These instances are pointed to as demonstrating that the investing public fails to make adequate use of the required
disclosure to protect itself against unsound investments. From this premise
it is argued that the disclosure philosophy itself is incapable of providing
adequate protection to the public.
Retention of State Securities Registration. The argument in favor of
maintaining the present pattern of state securities registration based on the
merit standard philosophy65 is thus predicated chiefly on the three criticisms
leveled at the federal preemption argument. First, it is contended that it is
only consistent with the principles of federalism to allow the states this degree of freedom to experiment with improvements in their corporate laws
in an effort to protect their citizens from securities fraud and overreaching
by unscrupulous promoters. Second, it is argued that the SEC is overworked and understaffed with its present responsibilities and is entirely unequipped to undertake the exclusive regulatory role in modern financial
markets. Third, the disclosure philosophy is rejected as totally inadequate
to protect the public from the devious schemes of the fraudulent. It is ar65 Id.
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gued that securities registration on the merit philosophy is alone adequate to
achieve this goal.
This argument for maintaining the status quo is rebutted on the basis of
three principal contentions, 66 which correspond in part to the arguments in
favor of federal preemption. First, it is argued that the existing state registration requirements impose an unreasonable burden on an essentially interstate economy and unduly restrict legitimate business financing and free
investment markets. Second, it is argued that the diversity of administrative regulation and interpretation under discretionary merit standards creates
a pointless degree of confusion, complexity, paperwork, and uncertainty,
which far exceeds reasonable state experimentation under the principles of
federalism. Finally, it is argued that the merit standard philosophy is actually inadequate to protect the public and that the disclosure philosophy
is more effective. It is also argued that the state merit standard philosophy
often imposes unfair and discriminatory requirements on a new business,
which fails to provide much actual protection to the public but which tends
67
to reflect the prejudices and fallible judgments of the administrator.
Thus, new industrial development and economic growth may be restrained,
while the truly unscrupulous, who make no effort to comply with the registration requirements, may go unchecked because the state administrator
will frequently lack adequate resources and staff for vigorous enforcement of
the antifraud provisions of the statute, due, in part, to concentration of resources and staff on the administration of the securities registration provisions.
Adoption of the Uniform Securities Act. As the third principal alternative, the Uniform Act has been urged as a moderate, balanced position
68
which would deny the extremes of both of the two foregoing positions.
The Uniform Act, it is argued, would allow retention of both state jurisdiction and a significantly modified merit standard system of securities registration, which would overcome the major political and practical obstacles to
the federal preemption argument. The Uniform Act would, however, create
both an important degree of uniformity between those states which adopt
it and a unique system of coordination between the state and federal registration of an interstate securities offering.
Although the Uniform Act has been recognized as a major achievement
and a substantial improvement over the previously existing condition, it is
also clear that the Uniform Act has failed to eliminate the problems in this
area for three reasons. First, several of the principal financial states have
not adopted the Uniform Act in any form. Second, many of the states
which have purported to adopt the Uniform Act have made basic changes
in key provisions, with the result that there is much less actual uniformity
66 See notes 57-59 supra.

67 See MOFSKY; Bloomenthal, supra note 59; Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on New
Business Promotions, 1969 DUKE L.J. 273; Mofsky, Reform of the Blue Sky Laws, 23
VAND. L. REV. 599 (1970); Mofsky, State Securities Regulation and New Promotions:
A Case History, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1401 (1969).

68 See note 60 supra.
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among even those states than might reasonably have been expected.
Finally, the retention of the merit standard philosophy in the Uniform
Act creates an inevitable risk of uncertainty and lack of uniformity with respect to the actual administrative interpretation of -the merit standards as
applied to each securities offering. Even if all states with securities registration statutes should limit the administrator's discretion to deny registration
to those issues which have "worked or tended to work a fraud upon a purchaser or would so operate" and those which involve "unreasonable" promoters' compensation and underwriting costs, the sweeping discretion conferred by these provisions is highly subjective with each state's administrator
and is thus inherently unpredictable. Each administrator must use his own
interpretive judgment with respect to each securities offering to determine
what, in his opinion, "tends to work a fraud" and what costs are "unreasonable." It is not likely that numerous state administrators operating independently under registration standards of this type will draw the same inferences and reach the same conclusions on any given securities offering.
Nor is there much assurance that two or more issues with similar attributes
will receive consistently similar rulings in the same state, although this problem may be reduced by published administrative rules and experienced personnel. Indeed, there is little likelihood of actual uniformity among the
states so long as discretionary merit standards are retained as the basis of
securities registration at the state level.
B.

An Analysis of the Issues Raised in the Debate

From the foregoing it can be seen that throughout the debate regarding
the problems created by state securities registration requirements there
have actually been two fundamental and essentially distinct issues on which
opinion has divided: First, whether state jurisdiction with respect to securities registration is reasonable and valuable or whether it should be totally
preempted by federal jurisdiction; and second, whether the better approach
to securities registration requirements is represented in the merit standard
philosophy, which has been traditional in state law, or is reflected in the disclosure philosophy.
Each of the three major positions in the debate has presented a combined
position on these two issues, but little attention has been devoted to separating the two issues and considering the merits of each independently. Nor
have the three major positions in the debate included all of the possible combinations of positions on the two basic issues. Since the debate
along these lines has thus far failed to produce a completely satisfactory
solution, the two fundamental issues should be separated and considered independently on their merits, and new combinations of positions on them
should be explored.
The federal preemption argument has presented a combined argument in
favor of both exclusive federal regulation and the disclosure philosophy, and
has opposed both state jurisdiction and the merit standard philosophy. In
rebutting the preemption argument, the status quo advocates have defended
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state jurisdiction against the threat of federal preemption and have criticized the disclosure philosophy, particularly as represented in the Securities
Act of 1933, in defense of the merit standard philosophy. The Uniform
Securities Act, though representing a moderate view, has sided with the
status quo argument on the two fundamental issues, since it proposes retention of both state jurisdiction and a modified form of the merit standard
philosophy.
No serious consideration has been given to the remaining combination of
positions on the two basic issues. This view would propose retention of state
jurisdiction with respect to securities registration, provided that the state registration requirements were based on some form of the disclosure philosophy
rather than on the merit standard philosophy. State requirements would
then be consistent with the federal securities registration policy based on the
disclosure principle and would avoid unreasonable interference with national
financial and securities markets. It is submitted that this possibility should
be examined more carefully.
If the question of state jurisdiction with respect to securities registration
is considered separately from the dispute between the disclosure philosophy
and the merit standard philosophy, it becomes clear that there need be no
serious objection to state jurisdiction per se, provided state regulation does
not invoke a philosophy which conflicts with the policy of the parallel
federal regulation, or which imposes serious burdens on interstate financial
markets and securities distributions. Indeed, if the state regulation were
based on a policy entirely consistent with and complementary to the parallel
federal regulation, the additional manpower and ideas of the state regulatory agencies could be an extremely helpful supplement to the SEC in the
common effort to protect public investors through disclosure, without unreasonably hindering legitimate business financing and avenues of public investment. If the basic policy conflict were eliminated, reasonable experimentation at the state level with new and improved methods of implementing
the disclosure philosophy would be entirely consistent with the principles of
federalism, and might produce better techniques for effective disclosure to investors than have been developed thus far under the federal statute.
On the other hand, the key problems which confront the federal preemption argument are the practical and political difficulties raised by proposing to eliminate the role of the existing state regulatory agencies and to
vest exclusive authority in the SEC. There is inevitable resistance to any
proposal which would both eliminate the employment of numerous state officials and also deny the states any active role in protecting the public with
respect to securities distributions within their borders. In addition, the
SEC is not adequately staffed to undertake the exclusive responsibility in
this area, nor is it likely to be. Indeed, the SEC has indicated that it appreciates the assistance and cooperation it now receives from the state securities agencies. 69 Therefore, if state jurisdiction with respect to securities
registration could be retained, but state registration requirements could be
69 See MOFSKY 85.
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restricted to a policy consistent with the parallel federal regulation, most of
the practical difficulties encountered by the federal preemption argument
would be overcome, and many of the hardships on legitimate interstate securities markets would be relieved.
C. An Analysis of the Merit StandardPhilosophy of
Securities Registration
From the foregoing analysis it is clear that the critical issue in the debate is
not actually the issue of state jurisdiction or federal preemption. Rather, it
is the conflict between the federal disclosure philosophy of securities registration and the state merit standard philosophy. Indeed, many of the most
aggravated problems created by state securities registration are directly attributable to the merit standard approach itself, and it is arguable that
this alone is the ultimate source of the regulatory dilemma. Yet the traditional state merit standard philosophy is vigorously defended by the opponents of federal preemption as being essential to provide adequate protection for the public. 70 It is necessary, therefore, to consider the merits of
this argument and the validity of the state merit standard theory in contemporary financial and securities markets.
The historical origin of the state merit standard philosophy of securities
registration in Populist economic theory reflects a desire to protect a predominantly agrarian populace in the western and southern states which had
limited experience in business and financial matters, against oppression by
the business and financial world of the "Moneyed East" in the era before
World War I, when federal securities regulation was nonexistent.7 1 In
this historical context a licensing requirement for all securities offered for
sale, with broad discretion in a public administrator to pass on the merits of
the security, was not unreasonable. However, the validity of this regulatory
concept in practice in the modern world is questionable for several reasons.
First, the success of the merit standard system standing alone depends
entirely on the adequacy of the administrator's review of each proposed
securities offering and on the reliability of his judgment of the merits.
This process has several limitations. It is quite possible that the most unscrupulous promoters, who have little hope of meeting the merit standards,
will frequently ignore the registration requirement altogether and take their
chances. 72 Since many administrators have their staffs fully occupied with
administration of detailed merit standards, there will often be little likelihood of detection and restraint of illegal offerings and, thus, no public protection at all where it is most needed. As to distributions which are registered, the administrator's judgment on the merits is entirely human and,
therefore, both fallible and subject to personal bias. Indeed, it is a perennial
fact that the administrator is potentially corruptible and may actually become dangerous to public investors, since his approval of the merits of a se70

See note 58 supra.

71 See part I, section B, supra.
72 This has been suggested by Professor Bloomenthal. Bloomenthal, supranote 59.
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curity may carry great weight with them. 73 In any event, it is only necessary for the fraudulent or overreaching applicant for registration to deceive
the single administrator under the merit standard system, whereas under the
disclosure philosophy it becomes necessary for him to deceive all potential
investors, which is certain to be far more difficult.
However, a much more basic difficulty inherent in the merit standard system lies in the fact that the administrator is presented with an extremely difficult, if not impossible, task. Conceptually, he is expected to act in a
capacity equivalent to that of an investment adviser to the public as to
registered issues. It is his responsibility to assess the complex patterns of
risks and rewards involved in an unlimited variety of securities offerings, all
of which present some combination of potential risk and potential reward.
Public investors themselves usually disagree widely on the desirability of each
securities offering, since they are motivated by a variety of different investment purposes and ambitions. Nevertheless, the administrator under the
merit standard system may, in his discretionary judgment, impose the sanction of illegality on some offerings, while granting to others the privilege
of legality. In principle, this is intended to protect public investors against
the risk of loss inherent in unsound investments, but it is clearly beyond the
powers of the administrator to provide such protection. Those securities
which he approves and permits to be sold to the public always involve some
degree of risk, which may ultimately lead to serious loss for those who invest in them. On the other hand, those securities which the administrator
concludes are too risky to be sold to the public and which are denied registration, may in fact prove ultimately to be highly successful investments in
spite of their original speculative risks. When this happens, the public has
suffered a double loss: It has been denied an opportunity to participate
in a rewarding investment, and it has also lost the economic benefit of a
successful publicly financed business. In short, the administrator can easily
be in error whatever his decision, and whenever he errs in either direction,
the public will suffer the loss.
An additional limitation on the degree of public protection actually afforded by the merit standard theory is the fact that most of the state statutes
also contain extensive exemptions, the effect of which is to allow public marketing of many new securities offerings and to permit virtually all activity
in the securities trading markets to be conducted free of any -form of securities registration. 74 Since the securities trading markets actually represent the major source of public securities investments, 75 it is obvious that
public investors may incur substantial losses in those investments with no
protection whatever from the apparently strict merit standards which are only
73 Most state securities administrators, present and past, have been conscientious men
of high integrity. Unfortunately, however, there have been a few notable exceptions.

The only point intended to be made here is that the possibility of corruption is inescapable in any public office and that the merit standard philosophy inherently augments

the risk of harm from this possibility due to the subjective, discretionary power it vests
in the administrator.
74 The scope of the exemptions of principal importance in contemporary state blue
sky laws is summarized and tabulated in MOFSKY.
75 See part I, section A, supra. See also WHEAT REPORT 57-62, and app. 1..
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applied to a limited number of new issues.
In addition, the broad exemptions applicable to public securities distributions by a large number of established issuers produce the result that the
strict merit standards actually apply primarily to newer businesses which may
be in the early stage of development and which have relatively few shareholders. As Professor Mofsky has demonstrated, 70 this results in a clear
tendency to discriminate against new enterprises in favor of older, established businesses and, thus, to restrain potential competition. This is indeed
a surprising result for the system initiated by Populism. Nevertheless, this
curious pattern of discrimination against the public financing of new business
enterprise may actually have inhibited business and industrial growth in the
77
agrarian areas where Populism flourished.
The ultimate objection to the merit standard philosophy lies in the awesome power of the administrator, who is vested with sweeping discretionary
judgment to pass on each new securities offering subject to registration
with the potential sanction of illegality for those disapproved. This virtually
unchallengeable power to grant, deny, or condition access to the public capital markets as the administrator may deem appropriate plays an extremely
questionable role in otherwise free financial and securities markets. The
administrator is, in effect, given the power to control and direct the flow
of public investment capital among businesses and industries in accordance
with his judgment of their respective public desirability. Through the same
discretionary power, he is given the ability to control those new investment
opportunities which may become available to the public. Stripped to its essentials, the merit standard philosophy creates in the administrator an economic and financial potentate, whose tremendous power is too seriously
subject to potential abuse. The legitimacy of this power in a free society
raises the most serious questions, which have only been avoided in the
modern era by the creation of extensive statutory exemptions. Commensurate with the discretionary power vested in the administrator is the fact
that, as to those issues which are allowed to be sold to the public, it is impossible to avoid the implication of official approval of the merits of the securities. The likelihood of public reliance on this implication is obvious, despite the disclaimers usually required. Indeed, under the merit standard
system it is the duty of the administrator to pass on the merits of registered
securities offered to the public. Unless the administrator has failed to discharge this responsibility, the usual disclaimers of official approval of the
securities offered clearly contradict the facts and are meaningless.
In the last analysis, the merit standard system seriously overrates and overrelies on the wisdom and judgment of a single public official and creates inherently dangerous obstacles to free access to public capital markets and to
a free choice of public investment opportunities. The result, in practical
experience, is that the public investor receives far less actual protection from
76 See MOFSKY; Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on New Business Promotions, 1969

L.J. 273; Mofsky, Reform of the Blue Sky Laws, 23 VAND. L. REv. 599 (1970);
Mofsky, State Securities Regulation and New Promotions: A Case History, 15 WAYNE
L. REV. 1401 (1969).
DUKE
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the merit standard system than it pretends to afford. It is equally clear
that so long as the merit standard system is retained by the states, uniformity is highly unlikely, since it is reasonable to assume that state administrators applying discretionary, subjective criteria to each registered securities distribution will not all think alike all of the time.

III. A

PROPOSAL FOR A NEW APPROACH TO A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM

A.

An Analysis of the DisclosurePhilosophy of Securities
RegistrationUnder Contemporary Conditions

The foregoing considerations lead to the necessity for a careful evaluation
at this point of the disclosure philosophy of securities registration as it contrasts with the merit standard philosophy and as it relates to the needs of
public investors under contemporary conditions. It is submitted that the disclosure philosophy is, in principle, far more promising than the merit standard philosophy as a means of providing adequate protection for public
investors in contemporary securities markets. In view of the great variety of
securities available to contemporary investors and the many combinations of
risk and reward which they represent, the classic arguments of Louis Brandeis in support of full disclosure as the best means of public investor protection are equally as forceful and relevant to the needs of investors today as
they were in 1914:
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman. And publicity has already played an important part in the struggle against the Money Trust [through the investigation by the Pujo Committee concerning financial concentration]
But there should be a further call upon publicity for service.
That potent force must, in the impending
struggle, be utilized in many
78
ways as a continuous remedial measure.
After discussing the investigation and recommendations of the Pujo Committee concerning excessive underwriting charges and the Committee's proposals that regulatory authority be vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to certain railroad securities issues, Brandeis continued:
Publicity offers, however, another and even more promising remedy:
a method of regulating bankers' charges which would apply automatically to railroad, public-service and industrial corporations alike.
The question may be asked: Why have these excessive charges been
submitted to? . . . [W]hy have the investors submitted, since ultimately all these charges are borne by the investors, except so far as
corporations succeed in shifting the burden upon the community? . . .
But the investor's servility is due partly, also, to his ignorance of the
facts. Is it not probable that, if each investor knew the extent to which
the security he buys from the banker is diluted by excessive under78 L. BRANDEIs, supra note 11, at 92. The Pujo Committee was formed by the
House Banking and Currency Committee to investigate the "Money Trust" and its
effect on the New York Stock Exchange. For the report of the Pujo Committee, see
H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913).
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writings, commissions and profits, there would be a strike of capital
against these unjust exactions?
A recent British experience supports this view ...
Compel bankers when issuing securities to make public the commissions or profits they are receiving. Let every circular letter, prospectus or advertisement of a bond or stock show clearly what the
banker received for his middleman-services, and what the bonds and
stocks net the issuing corporation. That is knowledge to which both
the existing security holder and the prospective purchaser is fairly entitled. If the bankers' compensation is reasonable, considering the
skill and risk involved, there can be no objection to making it known.
If it is not reasonable, the investor will 'strike,' as investors seem to
have done recently in England.
Such disclosures of bankers' commissions or profits is demanded also
for another reason: It will aid the investor in judging of the safety
of the investment. .

.

. Now the law should not undertake (except

incidentally in connection with railroads and public-service corporations) to fix bankers' profits. And it should not seek to prevent investors
from making bad bargains. But it is now recognized in the simplest
merchandising, that there should be full disclosures. The archaic doctrine of caveat emptor is vanishing. The law has begun to require
publicity in aid of fair dealing. .

.

. Require a full disclosure to the

investor of the amount of commissions and profits paid; and not only
will investors be put on their guard, but bankers' compensation will
tend to adjust itself automatically to what is fair and reasonable. Excessive commissions-this form of unjustly acquired wealth-will in
large part cease.
But the disclosure must be real. And it must be disclosure to the
investor. It will not suffice to require merely the filing of a statement
of facts with the Commissioner of Corporations or with a score of other
officials, federal and state ...
To be effective, knowledge of the facts must be actually brought
home to the investor, and this can best be done by requiring the facts
to be stated in good, large type in every notice, circular, letter and
advertisement inviting the investor to purchase. Compliance with this
requirement should also be obligatory, and not something which the
investor could waive. For the whole public is interested in putting an
end to the bankers' exactions ...
The required publicity should also include a disclosure of all participants in an underwriting.
.
79

.

adviser is disinterested.

. The investor should know whether his

Admittedly Brandeis' remarks were not directly addressed to the present issue of federal-state relations in the area of securities registration or to the
implicit tension between the merit standard philosophy and the disclosure
philosophy. Nevertheless, his arguments in support of the disclosure philosophy are extremely relevant to the present subject for several reasons.
First, Brandeis' major concern was to expose and prevent the gross abuses
of "the Money Trust ' in handling public securities distributions to the detriment of both public investors and publicly held corporations which he
described in detail. He advocated the disclosure philosophy, therefore, not
79
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to lighten the regulatory burden on those who would abuse the public trust
in securities distributions, but because he was convinced that it was the most
effective method of actually preventing the abuses which he deplored. Second, it is clear that he regarded the disclosure principle as a superior method
of protecting the public in securities distributions in contrast to the essentially regulatory proposals of the Pujo Committee. While Brandeis was not
immediately concerned with state blue sky law, the Kansas act of 1911 had
been enacted two years earlier and was already being copied elsewhere
when he wrote. The merit standard philosophy reflected in the Kansas act
was similar in nature to the regulatory proposals of the Pujo Committee,
which Brandeis regarded as less adequate to protect public investors than the
full disclosure philosophy which he espoused. Also, he expressly rejected
the underlying premise of general merit standard regulation. Finally, it
is very clear that Brandeis' arguments in support of the disclosure philosophy as the best method of protection for public investors were a major influence in the decision to adopt the disclosure principle in the Securities
Act of 1933 in preference to the merit standard philosophy as reflected in
the state blue sky laws then in existence. 0 Thus, Brandeis' analysis of
the superiority of the disclosure philosophy is implicitly reflected in federal
securities registration policy to the present.
In addition to Brandeis' arguments, it is clear that the disclosure philosophy is far more compatible with a free society and with free financial markets than the merit standard philosophy. No public official is given the impossible task of passing on the merits of each securities distribution on behalf
of all members of the public under the disclosure philosophy. Instead,
each prospective investor is free to make his own investment decision
on the basis of his own assessment of the potential risks and the potential rewards involved in each distribution, and in order to do so he is supplied with complete and reliable investment information. If he chooses to
do so, he may take large risks in the hope of large returns on speculative investments. He is not denied this liberty by a public official who may have
a more conservative investment philosophy and who will not permit high
risk or speculative securities offerings to be made to the public under his interpretation of the traditional merit standards.
The disclosure philosophy also guarantees that all business enterprises
will have access to the public capital markets, provided the truth is told.
No public official or agency is empowered to control the flow of capital
investment among businesses. That this is more consistent with a free society
and a free economy than the merit standard system is obvious. Its impor,tance can scarcely be overstated. The history of the growth of American
business and industry and of the public securities markets since the turn of
the century demonstrates that free access to public capital markets is essential to the vitality and continued expansion of business and industry.
The merit standard philosophy inevitably injects governmental control over
access to capital on the thesis of investor protection. The disclosure philos80 See note 42 supra, and accompanying text.
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ophy, on the other hand, offers superior protection to public investors, without governmental interference with access to the public capital markets.
The stature and effectiveness of the disclosure philosophy is perhaps best
demonstrated by its general success in British securities law and under the
Securities Act of 1933. Although entering American securities law more
than two decades after the beginning of the state merit standard system of
securities registration, the SEC interpretation and enforcement of the disclosure philosophy under the Securities Act of 1933 has become widely regarded today as the principal source of investor protection in new securities
distributions. Indeed, specific problems with the particular disclosure sys.
tem provided by the Securities Act of 1933 and past SEC interpretation
have been recognized and have been emphasized by critics of the disclosure
philosophy as proof of its inadequacy. Nevertheless, the analysis in the
Wheat Report and subsequent SEC actions based on its recommendations
make it clear that the disclosure philosophy itself is valid and should be continued. Specific problems which have arisen are viewed as shortcomings of
the particular implementation of the disclosure philosophy under the Securities Act of 1933, which could be remedied by new interpretive and
rule-making actions by the SEC and, in part, by statutory revision.
Critics of the disclosure philosophy usually contend that merit standard
regulation is necessary to protect public investors from loss on highly speculative ventures, which investors may buy, and in certain famous instances
have bought, notwithstanding the disclosures required by the Securities
Act of 1933. However, these instances do not support a conclusion that the
state merit standard system is any better protection of the public against such
losses. Indeed, the state merit standard system was in full effect during
the same episodes but failed to prevent the losses incurred by the public.
Also, the great market collapse and massive public losses on investments of
the 1929-1933 period occurred notwithstanding two decades of public protection under the widespread state merit standard system of securities registration. It is clear, therefore, that neither system provides absolute assurance that public investors will not experience losses by investing in securities.
The real issue is which of the two systems provides the greater protection
for the investing public, the greater deterrence of fraud, and is in greater
agreement with the principles of free financial and securities markets and a
free society. It is submitted that the answer is the disclosure philosophy.
Furthermore, as demonstrated above, there have been major changes in
the character of American securities markets and in the composition, experience, and sophistication of the investing public since the inauguration
of the state merit standard system in 1911. Much of the thinking reflected
in the origins of the state merit standard system presumed an agrarian population with little experience or sophistication in securities investments. While
this may have been true in the Midwest in 1911, it is no longer true of the
nation as a whole. Also, when the blue sky cases were decided in 1917,
American securities markets were much smaller and less developed than today and were concentrated principally in eastern population centers.
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Hence, the Supreme Court holding that state securities registration or licensing systems did not impose an unreasonable burden on interstate securities
markets was not necessarily inconsistent with the conditions existing at that
time. Nor was there then any federal statute or national policy on securities
registration based on a different principle of regulation.
But since the era of 1911-1917, when the present patterns in state securities registration were established, there have been major changes in American financial life which bring into serious question the current validity of
the policies established in that period. In the decades since World War I
there has been major growth throughout American financial and securities
markets and growth in the size, knowledgeability, and experience of the
American investing public. As a result, the financial and securities markets
today are highly organized and are essentially interstate and nationwide in
character, and the investing public is large, experienced, and informed. It
is, therefore, no longer reasonable to assume that the contemporary American investing public is wholly incapable of making its own investment decisions, if provided with adequate, timely, and accurate investment information. Nor is it true today that state securities registration based on the
merit standard philosophy does not impose substantial burdens on interstate securities markets. Indeed, under present conditions virtually all public transactions in securities involve interstate securities markets, and local
regulation of public securities transactions inescapably affects interstate commerce in securities. It is arguable that, today, state securities registration
requirements predicated on the merit standard philosophy impose burdens
on interstate securities markets which are both unreasonable and inconsistent with the policy of the parallel federal regulation based on the disclosure philosophy.
Based on the foregoing considerations, it is submitted that the disclosure
philosophy is, under contemporary conditions, the most appropriate and effective principle of securities registration and is the philosophy which
most adequately fulfills the real needs of contemporary American investors
for protection in securities distributions. In addition, the disclosure philosophy is clearly the most consistent with free securities markets for investors
and with free access by business and industry to the public capital markets. If those states which now impose securities registration requirements on
public securities distributions predicated their requirements on the disclosure
philosophy, rather than the merit standard philosophy, three important
beneficial results would follow. First, the major problems created by the
present system of state regulation based on the merit standard philosophy
and concurrent federal regulation based on the disclosure philosophy would
be eliminated. Although the disclosure requirements of the various regulatory authorities might differ with respect to a given securities distribution,
it is unlikely that the different forms or methods of disclosure would conflict with each other or would impair or prevent access to the public capital
markets in any state. The nature of the disclosure philosophy is such that
different disclosure methods or requirements do not pose the risks of con-
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flict or incompatibility that different regulatory requirements under the merit
standard philosophy create. At the same time, the inherent conflict which
now exists between the federal and state securities registration philosophies
would be eliminated. Second, state administrators implementing the disclosure philosophy rather than the merit standard philosophy might well develop a variety of new and improved disclosure techniques which could
make a significant contribution to the common effort to achieve maximum
protection of public investors through the best and most effective application
of the disclosure philosophy.
Finally, if the disclosure philosophy became nationwide and exclusive, the
unreasonable restraints and burdens now imposed on interstate securities
markets by the state merit standard philosophy would be removed, and the
excessive power now lodged in state securities administrators under the
merit standard system to control and condition access by business and industry to the public capital markets and to control and limit the new securities available to investors would be eliminated."' In short, the solution to the regulatory dilemma created by the prevailing system of state securities registration lies neither in the direction of uniformity of state statutes predicated on the merit standard philosophy, nor in the direction of
federal preemption of state jurisdiction over the subject. Rather, the solution to the problem lies in the nationwide adoption and implementation of
the disclosure philosophy, to the exclusion of the merit standard philosophy,
whenever registration requirements are imposed on public securities distributions.
B.

A Proposalfor the FederalSecurities Code

If the solution to the problems created by the present system of state securities registration is the nationwide adoption of the disclosure philosophy,
to the exclusion of the merit standard philosophy, by all jurisdictions which
impose securities registration requirements, the obvious question is: How
can this be accomplished? Ideally, the answer would be that the states
should be urged to reform their blue sky laws to adopt the disclosure philosophy of securities registration and to abandon the merit standard philosophy. Perhaps this effort might be fostered and encouraged by the promulgation of a new model or uniform state securities act premised on the disclosure philosophy. Indeed, such an effort might meet with partial success.
But the experience already recorded with respect to the present Uniform
Securities Act gives little encouragement to such an effort. Realistically,
there is no reason to expect that the many states which have refused even
to modify the language of their statutory merit standards to follow that ex81 That these powers of state securities administrators are excessive and do impair
access by business and industry to the public capital markets is best demonstrated by
the countless examples in the experience of attorneys representing issuers seeking registration under the state merit standard system and in the files of the state administrators.
Many issuers fail to qualify; many more may qualify only under severe financial strictures imposed by the administrator, which may be unacceptable if the business is to
obtain the capital it needs. A good illustration is quoted from Fortune Magazine in
CARY 1481-82. See also examples discussed in note 67 supra.
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pressed in the present Uniform Act would be any more willing to adopt a
model or uniform act premised on the disclosure philosophy. It is obvious
that the problem with reform of the state blue sky laws at the state level
is that success is entirely dependent on the state legislatures, which all too
frequently are preoccupied with other business and are instinctively reluctant
to change established traditions, particularly when the change is not supopposed-by the state securities administrator, as so
ported-or is actively
82
case.
the
is
often
Therefore, it is submitted that the problem should be dealt with by the
Federal Securities Code, as suggested by Professor Loss in the remarks quoted
at the outset of this Article. It is abundantly clear by now that American
securities and financial markets are thoroughly interstate in character and,
thus, properly the subject of federal regulation under uniform national policies. On the other hand, it is neither feasible nor necessary to exclude the
states from participation in the regulatory effort on the basis of full federal
preemption. The answer lies in the concept of partial or qualified federal
preemption to the extent necessary to achieve a uniform national policy with
respect to registration requirements imposed on public securities distributions and on access to the public capital markets. This could be accomplished through the Federal Securities Code.
It is proposed, therefore, that the Federal Securities Code adopt the position that the disclosure philosophy, in principle, represents the paramount
national policy with respect to all registration requirements which may be
imposed on public securities distributions affecting interstate securities and financial markets, and that the Federal Securities Code preempt state regulation only to the extent that it is based on the inconsistent merit standard
philosophy, but not to the extent that it is based on the disclosure philosophy. Under this proposal there would be no federal preemption of state
jurisdiction to require registration of public securities distributions. But the
state merit standard philosophy would be preempted by the Federal Securities Code on the basis of the proposition that this form of state regulation is inconsistent with the paramount federal regulatory philosophy applicable to the same transactions and creates unreasonable burdens and restraints on interstate securities markets under contemporary conditions.
In order to allow the states the maximum degree of freedom to experiment within the reasonable bounds of federalism, this proposal would not
restrict the state regulation to the specific methods of implementing the disclosure philosophy adopted by the federal regulation. On the contrary, the
states should be free, and, indeed, should be encouraged, to explore new
and different methods of achieving full disclosure of all material facts for the
protection of public investors. Imaginative innovation by the states within
the broad parameters of the disclosure philosophy could develop new and
improved disclosure techniques. In this way, state securities registration,
which now poses a serious regulatory problem, could become the source of
considerable public benefit and could make an invaluable contribution to the
82
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common effort to achieve maximum investor protection without unreasonably hindering access to the public capital markets or the availability of
public investment opportunities.
For example, each state could decide first whether it wished to experiment with the development of its own disclosure techniques, or preferred to
accept the federal methods and to concentrate its efforts in other directions,
such as rigorous enforcement of its anti-fraud standards. Those states
which chose to develop and enforce their own methods of disclosure might
devise improved forms of communication of material investment information to prospective investors. Where prospectus delivery is relied upon,
both the form and content of the prospectus and the time of its delivery
might be the subject of innovation. In addition, other publicity and selling
material might be utilized and subjected to supervision to improve the overall quality of disclosure to investors.
Those states strongly disposed to make use of the administrator's evaluation of the merits or risks of securities distributions might conceivably do
so under a disclosure system by requiring dissemination of the administrator's opinion as to the merits of the offering to prospective public investors in connection with each distribution. This could be done either by
mandatory inclusion of the administrator's opinion in or with the prospectus,
or by independent publication or broadcast by the administrator of his view,
or both, and this could be done in every case or only in those cases which,
in the opinion of the administrator, call for it. Thus, if, in the opinion of
the administrator, the proposed securities offering is unjust, unfair, or inequitable, or is hazardous for some specific reasons, that opinion and information could be required to be communicated effectively to all prospective investors. But if the required disclosures were made, the administrator
would be denied the power to refuse or restrict access to the public capital
markets to any business or industry.
This proposal offers several advantages and represents a new approach to
solving the existing regulatory dilemma. By retaining state jurisdiction with
respect to securities registration, excessive use of the power of federal preemption is avoided and the states are left free, within the reasonable bounds
of federalism, to adopt their own measures to protect their citizens. Also,
the states in doing so may make invaluable contributions to the development of improved methods of disclosure and will add their manpower to that
of the SEC in the common effort to protect public investors. But by invoking federal preemption of the state merit standard philosophy in favor
of a uniform national securities registration policy based on the disclosure
philosophy, the real source of the present regulatory dilemma will be removed, and the unreasonable degree of control over access to the public
capital markets and over the availability of new investment opportunities
which now exists will be eliminated. Although different disclosure requirements in the various states might create the need for different state disclosure documents in addition -to the SEC prospectus in a multistate distribution, this scarcely represents the degree of burden on business finance
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which presently exists under the merit standard philosophy and does not
appear likely to create unacceptable hardship.
C.

An Appraisalof Objections to the Proposal

Inevitably, any proposal which would simultaneously change long-standing traditions in the field, inject a novel proposition for resolution of a continuing debate along essentially moderate lines, and suggest a new challenge for the Federal Securities Code, is likely to meet with opposition. From
what has gone before, certain objections can be anticipated and should be
briefly discussed.
Is the proposal politically unfeasible? Throughout the continuing debate
concerning the existing regulatory dilemma, any proposal for federal preemption of state securities registration requirements has been widely criticized as being politically unfeasible and, thus, impractical. This objection
is often coupled with the observation that the SEC is not adequately staffed
to undertake the exclusive regulatory role in connection with securities distributions. The present proposal meets these objections in several ways.
First, by expressly avoiding full federal preemption of state jurisdiction
with respect to securities registration, the present proposal is far less drastic
than those for total federal preemption of state regulation. The states would
continue to play an important role in investor protection through securities
registration requirements, and the states would be left a considerable degree
of latitude on their choice of methods in the area of securities registration.
They would only be limited by a national regulatory policy based on the disclosure philosophy, rather than the merit standard philosophy, in recognition of the realities of contemporary conditions. This retention of state
jurisdiction, and an important degree of state flexibility, should eliminate
the most serious political obstacles to the earlier full preemption proposals.
It would clearly avoid putting the SEC or the federal securities registration
system in the role of the exclusive regulatory authority and system. Therefore, this proposal should not be wholly unfeasible politically, although some
opposition may be anticipated. If the proposal is worthwhile, the possibility
of some opposition should not deter its consideration at the outset.
A related objection may be anticipated based on the venerable argument in defense of states' rights. The argument that states should be
left free to adopt any methods they deem appropriate to protect investors
within their borders is best answered by the observation, based on the
foregoing analysis, that contemporary American securities and financial
markets are thoroughly national and interstate in character, and that under
the principles of federalism the right of the states to impose regulation on
these markets in the interest of investor protection is subject to reasonable
limitation based on paramount national policy. In any event, the present
proposal would not totally displace state jurisdiction and authority in the
field and, thus, should be able to withstand any criticism based merely on
the states' rights argument.
The most serious objection to the present proposal will inevitably come
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from the defenders of the merit standard philosophy itself, and will be
based on the contention that the merit standard philosophy alone is sufficient
to deal adequately with the problems of investor protection in public securities distributions. It has already been demonstrated that the central issue
in the continuing debate is, in fact, the basic conflict between the disclosure
philosophy and the merit standard philosophy. The present proposal would
clearly displace the merit standard philosophy in favor of the disclosure
philosophy. It is submitted that this issue of policy must be dealt with
squarely on its merits, and that the reasons for a decision in favor of the disclosure philosophy have been fully stated.
Finally, the objection may be raised that the important codification project to develop a Federal Securities Code should not become burdened with
a potentially controversial issue, reflecting a change in traditional policy,
which might endanger the ultimate success of the Code. The initial answer
to this objection is that it is premature. Inevitably, and properly, the codification project will attempt significant improvements in the effectiveness
of federal securities regulation, particularly where necessary to conform to
contemporary conditions in the securities markets and to the needs of
contemporary public investors. Professor Loss himself has suggested that
the matter of state blue sky law should be reconsidered in the codification
project. The present proposal responds to that suggestion; it would clearly
not be harmonious with any suggestion that it be coupled with the addition
of merit standards to the federal regulation. 83 Precisely the opposite is intended. State jurisdiction should not be preempted, but the merit standard
philosophy should be.
As to whether the codification project should undertake the matter at all,
one must agree with Professor Loss that "certainly we should not exclude
this subject from consideration, because, if there is ever an opportunity to
do something about it, this will be it, and surely some rationalization should
' 84
be possible after thirty-five years or more of joint federal-state regulation.
It is submitted that the present proposal offers -the best rationalization of the
matter, and that it should be attempted. If opposition to this proposal should
ultimately become so great as to threaten the success of the Code, which
seems unlikely, that situation could better be dealt with then. The mere
possibility should not preclude the attempt to deal with one of the oldest
problems in American securities regulation, which continues to increase in
difficulty and which has yet to be satisfactorily resolved by other means.
IV.

CONCLUSION

State securities registration requirements based on the merit standard
philosophy have produced a serious dilemma for interstate financial and securities markets. The parallel federal securities registration has traditionally
avoided any preemption of state regulation by express statutory provision,
and the problems have, therefore, only increased in complexity with time.
83 See Loss, supra note 1.
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The Uniform Securities Act offered substantial improvement but has been
only partially successful because it has been adopted by only some of the
states, often with drastic changes, and because, in any event, it retains a
modified form of the merit standard philosophy.
On analysis it appears that the root of the difficulties in this area lies in
the subjective and discretionary merit standard philosophy itself, and not
necessarily in state jurisdiction with respect to securities registration. The
argument for and against federal preemption of the area has been inconclusive
and has perhaps been too preoccupied with the issue of jurisdiction. A new
approach to the problem is necessary. This new approach would propose
that the regulatory dilemma could be satisfactorily resolved if all jurisdictions which impose registration requirements on public securities distributions
did so on the basis of the disclosure philosophy, rather than the merit standard philosophy.
Disclosure is arguably the superior method of investor protection with respect to public securities distributions in the modern world and in contemporary national securities markets. In any event the disclosure philosophy is well established as the federal policy with respect to securities registration, which, it is proposed, should be given paramount effect in the interstate securities markets of today. The disclosure philosophy is far less
likely to produce inconsistencies and conflicts between concurrent jurisdictions with respect to the same securities offering. The disclosure philosophy
is also better suited to meet the real needs of contemporary American investors, and avoids the excessive power in a public official to control or
allocate access to the public capital markets among businesses and industries which is implicit in the merit standard philosophy.
It is proposed that the Federal Securities Code should include provisions
which would not preempt state jurisdiction to impose registration requirements on public securities distributions, but which would preempt the merit
standard philosophy by declaring the disclosure philosophy to be the paramount national policy applicable to all securities registration requirements
imposed on transactions affecting interstate securities markets. Under this
proposal all states would still be free to act with diligence to protect investors
within their borders and could make a valuable contribution through the development of new disclosure techniques in the area of securities registration. States could not, however, impose discretionary merit standards to
control or condition access to the public capital markets or to deny investors the liberty to make their own investment choices. This new approach
to the problem should ultimately provide the basis for an adequate resolution
of the dilemma created by the existing state securities registration requirements.

